Abstract. Key-insulated cryptography is a crucial technique for protecting private keys. To strengthen the security of key-insulated protocols, Hanaoka, Hanaoka and Imai recently introduced the idea of parallel key-insulated encryption (PKIE) where distinct physically-secure devices (called helpers) are independently used in key updates. Their motivation was to reduce the risk of exposure for helpers by decreasing the frequency of their connections to insecure environments. Hanaoka et al. showed that it was non-trivial to achieve a PKIE scheme fitting their model and proposed a construction based on the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. The security of their system was only analyzed in the idealized random oracle model. In this paper, we provide a fairly efficient scheme which is secure in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles). To do so, we first show the existence of a relation between PKIE and the notion of aggregate signatures (AS) suggested by Boneh et al. We then describe our random oracle-free construction using bilinear maps. Thus, our contributions are both on the concrete side, namely the first realization of parallel key-insulated encryption without the random oracle idealization, and on the conceptual side revealing the relationships between two seemingly unrelated primitives.
Introduction
Nowadays, protecting cryptographic keys is an issue of huge importance. Hazards of key exposure are indeed ever-increasing due the growing use of mobile devices allowing remote unprotected access. This problem has been major concern to the research community for a decade. It is certainly a more serious threat for security customers than algorithms attempting to solve number theoretic problems by brute force.
To mitigate its potential damages, key-evolving protocols were studied in various flavors: forward-security [1, 3, 14] , intrusion-resilience [27, 19] and keyinsulation [20, 21] . The latter paradigm was introduced in 2002 by Dodis, Katz, Xu and Yung [20] . It was motivated by the upcoming setting of "Ubiquitous Computing" where each user will possess more than one computer (e.g. a computer at the office and a mobile phone which is also a computer) where not all computers have the same availability and/or security. The general idea of key-insulated security was to store long-term keys in a physically-secure but computationally-limited device called base or helper. Short-term secret keys are kept by users on a powerful but insecure device where cryptographic computations take place. Short term secrets are then refreshed at discrete time periods via interaction between the user and the base while the public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime of the system. For a total of N time periods, such a mechanism is said to be (t, N )-key-insulated if a compromise of up to t periods leaves the remaining N − t time periods unharmed. A scheme is additionally said strongly key-insulated when adversaries corrupting the base remain unable to perform private key operations on behalf of the user.
An increased tolerance against key exposures is thus allowed by frequent updates of private keys. This unfortunately implies frequent connections between the helper device and the network and thereby an increased risk of helper key exposure. A theft of the helper's base key is quite damaging as it typically requires to restart the system with a new public key. It even jeopardizes strongly keyinsulated protocols where the additional exposure of a single time period at the user definitely crashes the system. This recently motivated Hanaoka, Hanaoka and Imai [26] to make a significant step forward and introduce the concept of parallel key-insulated encryption (PKIE for short) where distinct independent helpers are alternatively used in key update operations. As argued in [26] , the involvement of two helpers may simultaneously increase the security of helpers and users by allowing for frequent updates without incurring a higher risk of helper exposure. In [26] , Hanaoka et al. provided a PKIE constuction which will be referred to as the HHI scheme in this paper. It was obtained from the BonehFranklin identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [8] and provably fits properly defined security requirements in the random oracle model [4] . However, a proof in the random oracle model can only serve as a heuristic argument as it is known (see e.g. [13] ) not to imply the security in the real world.
It is natural to wonder if secure PKIE schemes exist in the standard model and if they can be generically built from IBE. Indeed, equivalence relations are known [5, 20] between (N − 1, N )-key-insulated systems and identity-based schemes [36] , hierarchical extensions of which [24, 6, 7] also allowed for the design of other key-evolving protocols [29, 14, 19, 16, 38, 7] .
To answer those questions, we first point out an intuitive relation between PKIE and IBE systems that involve a signature scheme supporting aggregation as in the aggregate signing (AS) protocol put forth by Boneh et al. [9] . We then describe a PKIE scheme which, although non-generic, is demonstrably secure in the sense of [26] without resorting to the random oracle methodology. Our construction uses a selective-ID secure IBE due to Boneh and Boyen [6] as a building block. It is fairly efficient and enjoys a security resting on the (by now well-studied) Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
In the upcoming sections, we first recall functional definitions and security notions for PKIE schemes. Section 3 discusses necessary conditions for building such a primitive from identity-based protocols. Our system and its security are respectively analyzed in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 then explains how to further secure our protocol against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Preliminaries

Model and Security Notions
A PKIE scheme over N stages consists of the following five algorithms.
Key generation: takes a security parameter λ and returns helpers' private keys mst 1 , mst 2 , a user's private key usk 0 and a public key pk. Helper-Update: takes as input helper j's private key mst j and a period number i to return an update key hsk i if i = j mod 2 and ⊥ otherwise. User-Update: is given user's private key usk i−1 for period i − 1, an update key hsk i and computes the private key usk i for period i. Encrypt: is given a message m, a public key pk and a period number i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and returns a ciphertext σ. Decrypt: given a ciphertext σ, a period number i and the matching private key usk i , returns either a plaintext m or ⊥.
The usual completeness requirement imposes Decrypt(pk, usk i , σ) = m whenever σ = Encrypt(m, i, pk) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. In the basic (i.e. non-strong) key-insulation security, if no helper is compromised, the exposure of any short-term secret leaves other periods safe as in [20, 21] . Besides, if a single helper is broken into while some stage i is exposed, only one other stage adjacent to i is also exposed (recall that even strongly key-insulated traditional schemes collapse in this scenario).
Definition 1.
A PKIE scheme is (t, ǫ)-secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks if no adversary has better advantage than ǫ in the following game within running time t. 1. The challenger C runs the key generation algorithm, hands pk to the adversary A and keeps mst 0 , mst 1 and uks 0 to itself.
ab for any (g, h) ∈ G × G and a, b ∈ Z; 2. efficient computability for any input pair; 3. non-degeneracy: e(g, h) = 1 GT whenever g, h = 1 G .
We require the intractability of these problems in bilinear map groups. Definition 2. Let (G, G T ) be bilinear map groups of order p and g ∈ G.
1. the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH) [28, 8] is to compute e(g, g)
. A distinguisher B (t, ε)-solves it if it runs in time at most t and
3 On Obtaining PKIE from IBE
The HHI scheme [26] (recalled in appendix A) uses the Boneh-Franklin IBE [8] as a building block. It is pointed out in [26] that constructing parallel key-insulated schemes from identity-based ones is non-trivial. For instance, one cannot settle for simply combining two IBE schemes by letting two Private Key Generators (PKGs) alternatively act as helpers for even and odd time periods. This naive approach indeed leaves half of the stages exposed after the compromise of only one helper. Another idea that falls short is to doubly encrypt (using the techniques of [22] ) messages for period i under identities i and i − 1 and let private key usk i consist of IBE private keys for identities i and i − 1. Unfortunately, the key usk i ⋆ may be exposed by merely corrupting periods i ⋆ − 1 and i ⋆ + 1. Nevertheless, the HHI construction stems from a careful double application of the Boneh-Franklin IBE. Although it was not explicitly mentioned in [26] , the key idea is to let a private key for period i be an aggregation of identity-based private keys for periods i and i − 1. We recall that identity-based cryptosystems traditionally involve private keys that are authorities' signatures on identities. As noted in [9] , the signature algorithm [11] that derives private keys from identifiers in [8] is compatible with a signature aggregation. This means that n signatures generated by distinct signers on possibly distinct messages may be merged into a single signature in such a way that verifiers can still ensure that all signers each signed their original message. In [26] , a private key for period i is the aggregation of both helpers' signatures on messages i and i − 1. The security in the sense of definition 1 relies on the intractability of extracting individual signatures from an aggregate of even only two signatures. In Boneh et al.'s scheme [9] , this problem was shown equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in [17] .
An intuitive connection thus turns out to exist between parallel key-insulated cryptosystems and identity-based encryption schemes extracting private keys using a signature scheme supporting aggregation. The infeasibility of extracting individual signatures from a 2-aggregate appears as a necessary condition for the underlying AS to provide a secure PKIE system. In the next section, we take advantage of this connection to devise a PKIE in the standard model. Our construction uses the selective-ID secure 1 [14] scheme of Boneh-Boyen [6] as a starting point. As previously mentioned by Canetti, Halevi and Katz [14] , selective-ID secure schemes are sufficient as building blocks for key-evolving protocols. Indeed, in security proofs, simulators have to guess in advance which time period will be the prey of attacks. This degrades security bounds by a factor that remains acceptable for any realistic number of time periods (such as N ≤ 2 30 ). We emphasize that constructing a PKIE scheme using Waters's fully secure IBE [37] would be overkill and would not yield a tighter reduction here 2 . In the selective-ID secure IBE of [6] , private keys are computed using a signature scheme which bears similarities with Waters's signature [37] but is only selective-message secure against chosen-message attacks. Unlike a recent variant [33] where signatures are sequentially computed, it only supports a limited aggregation as the size of an aggregate remains linear in the number of signers (as in a similar method suggested in [34] ). However, this scheme is sufficient for the pursued goal here as, in our construction, private keys are aggregates of only 2 individual signatures.
A Scheme with Chosen-Plaintext Security
As in [26] , private keys stored by users at period i are 2-aggregate signatures computed by helpers on "messages" i and i − 1.
Key generation: given a security parameter λ ∈ N, this algorithm
. initializes the user's private key to
where r −1 = f (sd 1 , −1) and r 0 = f (sd 2 , 0) are respectively derived from randomly chosen seeds sd 1 , sd 2 ∈ {0, 1} 1+log 2 p , 6. Helpers' private keys are set to mst 1 = sd 1 and mst 2 = sd 2 and the public key is
Helper-Update: given mst j = sd j and a period number i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N },
User-Update: given usk i−1 , hsk i and i,
. return usk i , discard usk i−1 and hsk i . At time period i, user's private key is always set to
with j = 2 − (i mod 2) and for uniformly distributed exponents
p is randomly chosen and j = 2 − (i mod 2).
Decrypt: given σ = (A, B, C, D) and
The completeness is checked by noting that
and raising both members of this equality to the power s.
The function f plays the crucial role of a "memory function" seeded by
where N is the number of time periods and τ exp stands for the cost of an exponentiation in G.
Proof. We construct an algorithm B that solves the DBDH problem in (G, G T ) using an adversary A against the IND-CPA security of our scheme. The input of B is a tuple (g a , g b , g c , T ) ∈ G 3 × G T and it aims at deciding whether T = e(g, g)
abc thanks to its interaction with A. As explained in section 2.1, two kinds of adversaries are distinguished:
Type I adversaries: do not corrupt helpers during the game. Type II adversaries: corrupt exactly one helper without exposing a private key that would trivially compromise the attacked period i ⋆ .
At the outset of the simulation, B tosses a coin COIN R ← {0, 1} to guess which kind of attack A will produce. If COIN = 0, it expects to face a Type I adversary. If COIN = 1, it forecasts a Type II behaviour from A. Our simulator B also chooses an index ℓ R ← {1, . . . , N } as a guess for the time period to be attacked by A. W.l.o.g., we shall assume that ℓ is odd as the case of an even ℓ can be handled in a completely similar manner. In all cases, B generates the public key as follows. It selects γ R ← Z * p , and defines
It also computes I ℓ = H(ℓ) and I ℓ−1 = H(ℓ − 1) and sets g
p and thereby implicitly defines functions
A is initialized on input of (g, g 1 , g 2 , h, g
and issues exposure queries that are handled differently when COIN = 0 and COIN = 1. Informally, B uses the fact that A has no information on exponents r i (i ∈ {1, . . . , N }) unless she breaks into helper j = 2 − (i mod 2). When dealing with exposure queries, these exponents may be freely chosen for both even and odd stages when facing Type I attacks. In Type II attacks, they are constrained for either odd or even stages and B has to guess in advance the parity of constrained indexes.
• COIN = 0: B aborts if A issues a query i, class with class = "helper" or with i = ℓ. Otherwise, it can answer the query as private keys usk i are computable for i = ℓ. To do so, B selects r 0 R ← Z * p . For i = 1, 2, . . . , (ℓ − 1)/2, it picks r 2i−1 , r 2i R ← Z * p and computes
where I 2i−1 = H(2i − 1). We observe that usk 1 , . . . , usk ℓ−1 have the correct shape. If we definer 2i
and h 
usk 2i+1 = h
where I 2i = H(2i). We check that usk ℓ+1 , . . . , usk N are correct keys as, if we
and h (7)- (11) . Therefore, it obtains all private keys but usk ℓ−1 , usk ℓ (though usk 0 and usk N +1 are never requested by the adversary, they are computable). Those private keys have the correct shape for uniformly distributed (unknown) elementsr 2i ∈ Z * p . b = 2: B has to compute private keys usk i with i = ℓ, ℓ + 1 as A is assumed not to request usk ℓ+1 . This time, exponents of even time periods have to comply with the constraint r 2i = f (sd 2 , 2i) for all i but exponents r 2i−1 are free.
and computes usk 2i , usk 2i−1 according to equations (1)- (6) and thereby obtains well-formed usk 1 , . . . , usk ℓ−1 , usk ℓ+2 , . . . , usk N for random (unknown) implicitly definedr 2i−1 .
Challenge: when A decides that phase 1 is over, she comes up with messages M 0 , M 1 and a target time period i ⋆ , B halts and reports "failure" if i ⋆ = ℓ. Otherwise, it flips a fair coin b ⋆ R ← {0, 1} a returns the challenge
Since F 1 (ℓ) = g t1 and F 2 (ℓ − 1) = g t2 , σ ⋆ has the same distribution as the output of the encryption algorithm if T = e(g, g)
abc . In contrast, if T is random in G T , σ ⋆ is independent of b ⋆ and A cannot guess b ⋆ with a higher probability than 1/2. Hence, B deduces that T = e(g, g)
abc if A's final output equals b ⋆ . Otherwise, it bets that T ∈ R G T .
When assessing B's success probability, we note that it may fail to provide A with a consistent view because of the following events: E 1 : a key exposure is made for period ℓ E 2 : a helper key exposure occurs and COIN = 0 E 3 : helper b's private key is exposed while COIN = 1 E 4 : a key exposure on usk ℓ−1 occurs while b = 1 and COIN = 1 E 5 : a key exposure on usk ℓ+1 occurs while b = 2 and COIN = 1
We also consider the following events:
H 0 : B correctly guesses i ⋆ = ℓ H 1 : B successfully foresees the kind of attack produced by A H 2 : B luckily predicts which helper's key is exposed when COIN = 1
The conjunction of events H 0 , H 1 and H 2 is readily seen to occur with probability greater than 1/4N and it suffices to prevent a failure of the simulation.
⊓ ⊔
Chosen-Ciphertext Security
Chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model can be achieved using ideas from [15, 10] but it is more directly obtained following the techniques of Boyen, Mei and Waters [12] which require to turn our scheme into a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [35] . A KEM [35] is a public key algorithm that, instead of encrypting messages as a regular public key cryptosystem, takes only a public key as input and returns pairs (K, σ) made of a randomly distributed key K and an encapsulation σ of it. The reverse operation is achieved by a decapsulation algorithm which, on input of a private key and an encapsulation σ, either outputs a key K or a rejection message ⊥. It is well-known [35] that a KEM immediately provides a public key encryption scheme when combined with a suitable symmetric cryptosystem.
The methods of [12] involve a piece of ciphertext acting as a checksum treated as part of an identity-based system by the simulator handling decryption queries.
In order to optimize the decapsulation algorithm, we use a trick suggested in [30, 32] to minimize the number of pairing calculations and render the consistency checking implicit in the computation of the key.
Key generation: is unchanged except that it additionally chooses a function H ′ : G → Z p which is either a collision-resistant hash function or a suitable injective encoding (see [12] for details on how to define such an encoding). The algorithm also picks another element g
Helper-Update and User-Update do not change. At period i, user's private key is still
with j = 2 − (i mod 2) and r i = f (sd j , i), r i−1 = f (sd j−1 , i − 1) ∈ Z * p . Encapsulate: given i and pk, let j = 2 − (i mod 2), pick s R ← Z * p and compute
s which encapsulates the key K = e(h, g 1 g 2 ) s .
Decapsulate: given σ = (A, B, C, D) and usk i = (u i,0 , u i,1 , u i,2 ), the receiver
To explain the decapsulation mechanism, we note that any properly formed encapsulation satisfies the (publicly verifiable) conditions
The naive approach is to return K = e(A, u i,0 )/(e(B, u i,1 ) · e(C, u i,2 )) if they hold and ⊥ (or a random K R ← G T from the key space) otherwise. This approach is perfectly equivalent to choose z 1 , z 2 , z 3 R ← Z * p and return
which is the actual decapsulated key if the encapsulation was correct and a random key otherwise. This alternative decapsulation mechanism is easily seen to be exactly the one suggested by relation (12) .
Overall, the cost of the decapsulation operation amounts to a product of four pairings (which is much faster to compute than a naive evaluation of four pairings as discussed in [25] ) plus a few exponentiations in G.
In appendix B, we formally define the KEM counterpart of parallel keyinsulated security. We then prove theorem 2 which claims the chosen-ciphertext security of our key-insulated KEM under the Decision BDH assumption.
Borrowing ideas from [31] , we can construct a CCA-secure KEM with as short ciphertexts and almost as efficient decryption as in section 4. As in [31] , this is obtained at the expense of longer private keys and a security resting on a slightly stronger assumption.
We also mention that a regular CCA-secure PKIE scheme can be directly achieved (without using the KEM-DEM framework) by implementing the checksum function F 3 using Waters's "hashing" technique [37] , much in the fashion of the cryptosystem described in section 3 of [12] . It unfortunately entails a much longer public key and a looser reduction.
Strong Key-Insulation
The scheme inherently provides strong key-insulation thanks to the erasure of discrete logarithms α 1 , α 2 of g 1 , g 2 after generation of the initial key usk 0 . Indeed, base keys sd 1 , sd 2 (that uniquely determine r 1 , . . . , r N ) are useless to adversaries as long as they do not additionally obtain any local secret usk i for any period.
To formally prove this fact (in a distinct game from the one of definition 1), we proceed as in the proof of theorem 1 with the sole difference that no key exposure query has to be tackled with. Hence, it does not matter if A knows exponents r i .
Key-Insulated Encryption with Auxiliary Helper
In [2] , Anh et al. generalized the notion of PKIE into a new primitive called key-insulated public key encryption with auxiliary helper. Such a scheme also involves two independent helpers but one of them is auxiliary and used in updates much less frequently (say every ℓ time periods) than the main helper. In practice, the latter can be a laptop performing updates every day while the auxiliary helper (e.g. a smart card) can be kept in a much safer location most of the time in order to decrease the chance of compromise of both helpers.
This results in noticeable enhancements since, when the main helper is compromised, another exposure at the user only harms ℓ time periods: the next update carried out by the auxiliary helper restores the security. Furthermore, simultaneous break-ins at the user and the auxiliary helper compromise at most two adjacent periods as long as the main helper is not also exposed.
In [2] , the HHI system [26] was extended into a key-insulated scheme with auxiliary helper (implicitly using aggregate signatures). Our constructions can be similarly extended to fit security definitions of [2] without using random oracles.
Conclusion
We pinpointed connections between the concept of parallel key-insulated encryption and certain identity-based cryptosystems using signatures supporting aggregation. This observation allowed for the design of a secure system in the standard model.
This motivates the open problem (with or without random oracles) of increasing the number of helpers without paying an important loss of efficiency. Our scheme and the one of [26] can both be extended to involve more than two helpers but this entails a significant computational penalty.
